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During the survey period, three cases of importance involving
the question of excessive awards for personal injuries were
decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In all three
the court, following established legal principles, refused to set
aside the verdicts.
In Cabler v. L. V. Hart, Inc.,' the plaintiff sustained a whip-
lash injury when the defendant's truck collided with the station
vagon she was driving. The issue of damages was tried before
the trial judge without a jury and plaintiff was awarded a
judgment in the amount of $25,803.00. The defendant appealed,
"contending that the award was so excessive as to show that it
was without support in the evidence, and capricious." Justice
Lewis stated that
if there is testimony upon which the lower court could
have based the amount of its award, we must affirm the
judgment. We have no power to review and award or
verdict for mere excessiveness or undue liberality.2
In assessing the amount of damages, the court considered that
at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was 44 years of age
and had a life expectancy of 28.67 years. She was a housewife
with two young children with responsibilities as a homemaker
and a mother. In addition, she assisted her husband upon occa-
sion in his insurance business. Medical testimony revealed that
her injuries resulted in fifteen to twenty percent permanent dis-
ability of the whole body, aggravated pre-existing conditions
of degenerative arthritis and lower back trouble known as
spondylolisthesis, causing great pain and discomfort which would
"diminish the joys and pleasures of a normal life especially with
a family." Since the plaintiff was not regularly employed,
the measure of damages could not be directly equated to loss of
earning capacity. Based on these considerations, the trial judge
made his award in the case. On review, the supreme court found
that there was no evidence that the "trial judge was actuated by
partiality, prejudice or other considerations outside the record."3
1. 164 S.E.2d 574 (S.C. 1968).
2. Id. at 575.
3. Id. at 576.
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The defendant also challenged the judgment on the ground
that it exceeded any amount previously awarded in similar cases.
The court, citing Haselden v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.14 affirmed.5
The court reasoned that in comparing verdicts involving per-
sonal injuries, the nature and extent of the pain and suffering
was a substantial element in assessing damages. In addition to
asserting that each case has to stand on its own facts, the court
considered existing economic conditions at the time of the injury
and the decreased or impaired purchasing value of the dollar in
comparing the present verdict with past verdicts for similar
injuries.
In Young v. Warr' the plaintiff received a permanent
paraplegia-producing injury to his spine and lumbar area when
the station wagon in which he was a passenger collided with the
rear end of a tractor trailer. The action was based on the
negligence of the deceased driver, and the case was submitted
to the jury which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for
$500,000 actual damages. The defense moved for a new trial
absolute, a new trial nisi or for judgment non obstante veredicto.
The presiding judge ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff filed
a remittitur of $100,000 within ten days. The plaintiff filed
the remittitur within the time limit, but the defendant nonethe-
less appealed upon the ground that the amount of the verdict was
excessive. The supreme court held that only the trial judge has
the power of setting aside a verdict absolutely or reducing it by
granting a new trial nisi when it appears that the verdict is
excessive in the sense that it merely indicates undue liberality
on the part of the jury.
In affirming the decision of the trial judge, the court con-
sidered that the plaintiff was a 23-year-old married man with
a life expectancy of 47.64 years. At the time of the accident,
he was a member of the United States Navy earning $345 per
month plus benefits and was enrolled in an advanced electronics
school where he ranked at the top of his class. As a result of
his injuries, he was hospitalized for eleven months, could not
learn to walk again and would be confined to a wheel chair
for the remainder of his life. lie had lost control of his
bladder and bowel functions as well as his ability to have marital
relations. The pecuniary losses to the plaintiff were substantial
4. 214 S.C. 410, 53 S.E2d 60 (1949).
5. Cabler v. L. V. Hart, Inc., 164 S.E.2d 574 (S.C. 1968).
6. 165 S.E2d 797 (S.C. 1969).
1969]
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and the embarrassment, humiliation, pain and suffering, and
resulting depression were patent.
On cross-examination the appellant tried to show that the
plaintiff was still receiving his Navy pay until June 17, 1965,
and subsequently received compensation from the Veterans Ad-
ministration totaling $700 per month. The appellant alleged that
the trial judge committed error in sustaining the plaintiff's
objection to such evidence. It is well established under the
"collateral source rule" that a tort-feaser cannot benefit by his
own wrongdoing and cannot mitigate his damages because of
compensation received by the injured party from an independent
source.7 In invoking this rule in Young, the court relied on
the persuasive authority of Belt v. Prrneau8 and Cunnie V.
Superior Iron Works Co.9 Both cases held that servicemen
could recover for loss of earning capacity although they con-
tinued to receive compensation from the government.
The third case in this category is the celebrated decision of
Mickle v. Blackmon." On May 29, 1962, Janet Mickle was a
passenger in an automobile which was involved in a collision
with an automobile driven by Larry Blackmon. Janet was
impaled on the gearshift lever of the automobile which pene-
trated to her spine at breast level causing complete and per-
manent paralysis of her body below the point of injury. The
trial court awarded an apportioned verdict of $468,000 for the
plaintiff against Cherokee, Inc., for negligence in removing
stop signs at the intersection while widening the road, and
$312,000 actual damages against Ford Motor Company for
negligently designing the automobile in which the plaintiff
was riding. No damages were assessed against Blackmon.
Cherokee and Ford appealed, urging that the $780,000 awarded
as actual damages was "so grossly excessive as to require a new
trial."" The supreme court declined jurisdiction to review issues
of fact in a law case, but in examining the facts as presented
in the trial record, Justice Brailsford noted that at the time
of the wreck, Janet Mickle was 17 years of age, was active,
very athletic and enjoyed a good social life. As a result of
the collision, she suffered immediate and permanent paralysis
7. Id. at 806, quoting 25 C.J.S. Dainages § 99(1) (1966).
8. 104 N.H. 227, 183 A.2d 729, 7 A.L.R. 3d 512 (1962).
9. 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767, 18 A.L.R. 667 (1921).
10. 166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969).
11. Id. at 194. Justice Bailsford recognized that the verdict was probably
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of her body below the point of injury. The paraplegia was so
complete that she was totally unable to help herself or control
her bodily functions. The plaintiff required continuous care,
and it appeared that she would live out a normal life expectancy.
The court considered that because her mother and father were
respectively thirty-two and thirty-eight years older than she,
the plaintiff would be without the help of her parents for 9,
period of thirty to thirty-five years of her life. Calculating the
cost of a practical nurse at the present rate of $14.00 per eight
hour shift over a period of thirty-two years, the plaintiff would
require $458,560 to provide adequate care for herself. Justice
Brailsford concluded that the record amply justified the award.
Acting Associate Justice Legge vigorously dissented on the
issue of damages and felt that the verdict should be set aside
for three reasons. First, an award of $780,000 invested at six
percent would yield $46,800 annually, which is more than neces-
sary to support the plaintiff with all the necessities and comforts
of life. He suggested that a figure of $600,000 invested at four
percent, which is the average interest rate on government obliga-
tions, would yield an annual income of $24,000 which would
amply support the plaintiff "even under our presently inflated
economy."
Secondly, if reasonable investments of the proceeds were made,
the principal would remain intact upon the plaintiff's death
and would pass by will or devise to persons for whose benefit
the award was not intended.
Finally, Justice Legge expressed his conviction that the verdict
was the product of prejudice against the corporate defendants
and sympathy for the plaintiff. This situation, he reasoned, was
engineered by plaintiff's counsel in his closing argument wherein
he referred to the defendants' great wealth and ability to pay.
An interesting adjunct to this case came subsequent to the
trial when Janet Mickle married and gave birth to a normal
baby without ill effects. The court held that this was insufficient
ground on which to support a new trial since the prognosis that
her disability was permanent had not changed and that it is a
well documented medical fact that paraplegia does not inca-
pacitate a woman from giving birth. In dismissing this as an
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It may be argued that this happy circumstance tended
to alleviate the plaintiff's mental anguish resulting from
her injuries; but, however that may be, we do not take it
into account in our scrutiny of the verdict, for the
simple reason that it was not within the jury's knowl-
edge or within the scope of its inquiry.12
B. Breach of Warranty
The common law position in an action for breach of warranty
is that the usual measure of damages is the difference in the
actual value of the item at the time of delivery and the value
of the item if it had been as represented.13 In Draffin v. C'hrys-
ler Motor Corp.14 the trial court, in its order nisi, allowed a
verdict to stand in excess of the value of an automobile involved
in a suit for breach of a manufacturer's warranty. The cause of
action drose in 1965, before the Uniform Commercial Code' 5
went into effect on January 1, 1968; thus, the Code was not
applicable to this action.
The plaintiff purchased the automobile from the dealer for
$3,491.90. The jury was properly instructed as to the measure
of damages in such an action and yet returned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff for $9,000. The trial court reduced this figure
to $3,981.90. The supreme court reversed and remanded, stating
that
a verdict in excess of the value of an automobile, in an
action on breach of warranty, must be set aside. The
verdict conclusively shows disregard by the jury of the
instructions of the court, or failure to heed instructions
as to the measure of damages. 16
C. WrongfuZ Death
The case of Zorw v. Crawford17 involved the death of a fifteen-
year-old girl caused by the collision of the automobile in which
she was a passenger with an oncoming vehicle that swerved into
her lane to avoid running into the rear of the defendant's
improperly lighted tractor. The jury awarded $250,000 actual
damages to the parents for the wrongful death of their daughter.
The defendant contended that the verdict was so excessive as to
12. Id. at 200 (dissenting opinion).
13. C. McCormxicK, HANDECOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 176 (1935).
14. 166 S.E.2d 305 (S.C. 1969).
15. See S.C. CODE Axx. §§ 10.2-714,-715 (1966).
16. Draffin v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 166 S.E.2d 305, 306-7 (S.C. 1969).
17. 165 S.E.2d 640 (S.C. 1969).
5
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indicate that it was the result of passion or prejudice on the part
of the jury. Accordingly, he moved for a new trial absolute or,
in the alternative, for a new trial nisi. The trial judge denied
both motions. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded.
The South Carolina wrongful death statute' 8 provides that
damages in such an action are to be assessed in accordance with
the loss sustained by the beneficiaries of the decedent, and the
court in Zorn pointed out that there was no evidence that the
deceased girl had any earning capacity thereby leaving no
tangible factor of damage. As a consequence, the parents suf-
fered no pecuniary loss as a result of their child's death, and
damages were limited to the intangible elements of shock,
grief, sorrow, wounded feelings, loss of companionship, and
deprivation of the use and comfort of the deceased's society.
The court, reasoning that "the question is not one of the value of
the human life, but is rather the damages sustained by the
beneficiaries," rationalized that the amount awarded cannot
be without limitation and that "[tihere must be some semblance
of a basis for justifying the verdict." 9
Since the measure of damages in a wrongful death action is
measured by the loss to the beneficiaries, it was argued in Janes
v. Dague,20 that in assessing the award, consideration should be
given to the life expectancy of the beneficiaries. In that case,
a fifteen-year-old girl was killed when the automobile in which
she was a guest-passenger overturned. The jury found for the
plaintiff and awarded $25,000 actual damages. On appeal, the
defendant contended that the weight of authority properly
allows the life expectancies of the beneficiaries to be taken into
account in measuring the beneficiaries' damages in a wrongful
death action.2' While indicating that it might agree if the
issue was properly presented, the court reluctantly relied on the
rule in Trimmier v. Atlantic & C. A. L. Ry.2 2 which disallowed
a consideration of the beneficiary's life expectancy. In affirming
the lower court's decision, Justice Lewis concluded:
Although defendants state in their brief that the rule
adopted in Trimmier and Turbyfill is unsound, they
have not sought permission to argue against these cases
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1952 (1962).
19. Zorn v. Crawford, 165 S.E.2d 640 at 645, 646 (S.C. 1969).
20. 166 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1969).
21. See 25A C.J.S. Death § 121 (1966), which states that evidence of the bene-
ficiaries' life expectancies is admissible if the beneficiaries were dependent on
the decedent. See also 22 Am. JuR. 2d § 162 (1965).
22. 81 S.C. 203, 62 S.E. 209 (1908).
1969]
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in accordance with the procedure set forth in Rule 8,
Section 10, of the Rules of this Court. While there is
some doubt as to the soundness of the rule adopted in
Trimmier and Turbyfill, we think the plaintiff is en-
titled to the application of the principle of stare decisis
to the present situation, in the absence of a request in
the prescribed manner that these cases be overruled.
28
D. Impainent o f Future Earning Capacity
A substantial element of damages where permanent injuries
are sustained is the award for impairment of future earning
capacity. In the case of Steeves v. United States2 4 the court
faced the problem of assessing the impairment to the future
earning capacity of an eleven-year-old child. The late Profes-
sor McCormick stated that "since the attempt is to value future
capacities, a child with no present earning power at al may
recover in advance for the anticipated loss of earning power after
he becomes of age." 25 In this action arising under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, medical evidence showed that the plaintiff,
a military dependent, suffered a five percent disability of the
whole person due to peritonitis resulting from the negligence of
government physicians in treating him for appendicitis. Using
the mortality table in the South Carolina Code,20 it was deter-
mined that the plaintiff had a life expectancy of 56.80 years and
49.46 years from the reaching of his twenty-first birthday. The
court admitted testimony of an actuarial expert's opinion that
"based on the race, sex and completion of college" the plaintiff is
in a class of persons who would earn $413,496.00 in his lifetime.
The plaintiff urged that a figure of $20,674.80 would constitute
a proper award. This figure is arrived at by taking five percent
of $413,496.00 and is based on the work-life expectancy of the
plaintiff discounted at four and one-quarter percent. The court
rejected in part the positions of the plaintiff and felt that an
award of $9800 was just and proper for loss of future earnings
and impairment of future earning capacity.
E. 0onvenant Not To Sue
In NfCornbs v. Stephens,2 7 the plaintiff was involved in a
three-car collision and brought an action against the defendant
23. Jones v. Dague, 166 S.E.2d 99, 103, (S.C. 1969).
24. 294 F. Supp. 446 (D.S.C. 1968).
25. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 86 (1935).
26. S. C. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (1962).
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after entering into a covenant not to sue with the driver of the
third automobile. On appeal, the defendant alleged that the
trial judge committed reversible error in allowing the evidence
concerning the covenant to go before the jury. The court reversed
the decision of the trial judge, relying on the recent case of
Powers v. Temple28 as to the correct method of crediting a
defendant for amounts paid to a plaintiff under a covenant not
to sue. The court held that where there are no factual questions
concerning the covenant, the jury should assess the amount of
damages against the defendant and the court should then give
credit for the covenant after the size of the award has been
determined. This would eliminate possible prejudice to the
defendant and would afford certainty in the allowance of credit.
F. Apportionment of Damages
Judge Lanneau D. Lide once described as "really unique ...
the South Carolina rule that where joint tortfeasors are sued, the
jury may sever the actual damages and apportion them ...."29
In Rourk v. Selvey,30 called by Justice Brailsford the first case
in the court's history to confront it squarely with "a plaintiff,
burdened by the operation of this rule[,] ... having standing to
impeach it, [and] seeking relief,"31 the court put an end to the
practice. Denying that any appellate tribunal in this state had
ever upheld jury apportionment of damages in similar circum-
stances, the court distinguished holdings in eleven cases dating
back to 1784.32
28. 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E,2d 759 (1967).
29. Lide, Some "Uniques" in South Carolina Law, 1 S.C.L.Q. 209, 214
(1950). Judge Lide thought this rule to be "firmly established in this State,"
and so did everyone else -as the court concedes. Rourk v. Selvey, 164 S.E.2d
909, 910 (S.C. 1969).
30. 1964 S.E.2d 909 (S.C. 1969).
31. Id. at 913.
32. The trial judge must have been surprised to learn that "[t]he error
was in the instructions to the jury and not in the verdict ... ." 164 S.E.2d
at 914. Adhering to the doctrine of stare decisis while at the same time ending
a 185-year-old practice called for imaginative judicial analysis, and Justice
Brailsford got the job done as artfully as possible. Yet the court's opimion is
inevitably strained and self-conscious. But more important than the court's
technique is the question of whether the practice in fact deserved to be ended.
On that score the court was content to call the rule "unjust and illogical
because it deprives a plaintiff of the right [to pursue] for the full amount of
damage sustained .. . all wrongdoers whose actionable conduct has [proxi-
mately contributed to his] indivisible injuries . . . ." 164 S.E.2d at 914. In
the present case the jury assessed $5,000 against defendant Keller and $45,000
against defendant Selvey. If the same $50,000 verdict, unapportioned, is re-
turned on re-trial, the plaintiff will be able to pursue Keller alone for the full
amount. By contrast comparative negligence statutes (not enacted in South
Carolina, but see the Survey of Insurance, infra at 619) are based on the
1969]
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The earliest decision83 - the one most frequently supposed
to have established apportionment-was called unreliable since
its report was not written until much later.8 4 A similar state-
ment in the second such case35 was attributed to "the reporter's
preoccupation with this subject . . ... 6 Several appeals of
apportioned verdicts were, 87 or could have been,38  disposed
of on other grounds; still other precedents dealt with apportion-
ment of damages in the limited context of "responeat superior
actions against a master and servant, which are not in point
and will not be reviewed ... ."39 In short, the court found "scant
authority for the doctrine allowing apportionment of damages
among joint tort feasors, which has been regarded as settled law
in this state."140 So the rule - if there was one - permitting
such apportionment by a jury is now extinct in South Carolina.4 '
This jurisdiction may have been its only common law refuge.
42
GEaALD M. Fin r.
notion that damages should be proportioned to fault when more than one party
contributed to the harm. See Lambert, The Case for Comparative Negligence,
2 TRIAL LAwYERs Q. 16 (1965).
33. White v. M'Neily, 1 Bay (1 S.C.L.) 11 (1784).
34. Such a view of the early South Carolina reports, if strenuously applied,
might prove significant.
35. Whitaker v. English, 1 Bay (1 S.C.L.) 15 (1784).
36. 164 S.E.2d at 911.
37. Boon v. Horn, 3 Strob. (34 S.C.L.) 159 (1848); Rihame v. City of
Sumter, 113 S.C. 151, 101 S.E. 832 (1920); Deese v. Williams, 237 S.C. 560,
118 S.E.2d 330 (1961).
38. Bevin v. Linguard, I Brev. (3 S.C.L.) 503 (1805).
39. 164 S.E.2d at 912 (footnote omitted). In this category the court cited
Mullikin v. Southern Bleachery & Print Works, 184 S.C. 449, 192 S.E. 665
1937) ; Thomas v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 177 S.C. 411, 181 S.E. 565
1935); Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 142 S.C. 125, 140 S.E. 443
1927); Jenkins v. Southern Ry., 130 S.C. 180, 125 S.E. 912 (1924).
40. 164 S.E.2d at 913. For example, the verdict in Mickle v. Blackmon,
discussed supra, was jury-apportioned between the two tort-feasors.
41. Except, perhaps, in respondeat superior actions and cases where the
damages wrought by the joint tort-feasors are separately assessable in fact.
See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 42 (3d ed. 1964) (cited
by the court).
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